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The electronics industry has been a trailblazer and test bed for East Asian regionalization. 
Japanese firms have been a major source of capital, components and machinery, as well as 
business models and management techniques. However, in response to a persistent recession in 
this industry, the cards are now being reshuffled, giving rise to far-reaching adjustments in the 
region’s trade and investment patterns, and in the development trajectories of its electronics 
industries. The traditional “flying geese” model of economic interactions between Japan and East 
Asia has clearly come to an end as a unifying force of regionalization (Ozawa, 2003; METI, 
2003). But what new forces will shape East Asia’s future regional development patterns?  
Since the 1990s, American corporations have consolidated their leadership in semiconductors 
and computers, creating new product, software and service markets, e.g. the Internet, e-business, 
advanced microprocessors, and operating systems for an increasing variety of digital devices 
(Ernst, 2002a). Japanese electronics firms, on the other hand, have experienced a rapid erosion of 
their erstwhile leadership in consumer electronics and semiconductors, and they have failed to 
catch up with US industry leaders in the above new product, software and service markets. The 
electronics industry thus appears to support the assessment of Stephen Roach (chief economist of 
Morgan Stanley) that “the world is more US-centric now than it has ever been” (Roach, 2003). 
But does this imply that East Asia’s electronics industry will be “Americanized”? And which 
role will Japanese firms play in this game? This chapter analyzes one side of the equation. I 
explore how Japanese electronics firms are searching for new ways to transform their East Asian 
production networks (EAPNs) to cope with the new opportunities and challenges of a radically 
transformed East Asian regional economy. I document that, far from withdrawing from East 
1 Asia, Japanese corporate capital in the electronics industry now critically depends on the region, 
not only as a global export production base, but also as a major and increasingly sophisticated 
market for its products, services and technology, and as a source of lower-cost knowledge 
workers.
2 To benefit from the growing importance of East Asia, Japanese electronics firms are 
searching for ways to expand and upgrade their regional production networks, with a particular 
focus on China.  
The analytical challenge is to explain why Japanese firms are finding it difficult  to make the 
necessary adjustments in the organization and management of their regional production 
networks. Accumulated weaknesses of the Japanese business model provide part of the 
explanation. However, equally important exogenous forces are at work. A central proposition of 
the chapter is that competition between distinct national business models is no longer the 
dominant determinant of East Asian regionalization. The dichotomy: “Americanization versus 
Japanization” that has shaped the earlier literature is insufficient to capture what is really 
happening.  
More important are fundamental transformations in the organization of international business 
that are especially pronounced in the electronics industry (Ernst, 2003a): firms of diverse 
nationality compete and collaborate within multi-layered global “networks of networks” of 
marketing, production and innovation. This has forced Japanese firms into dense interaction with 
a multitude of firms from the US as well as from East Asia’s leading electronics exporting 
countries. Another critical exogenous  force has been  the rise of China as a global export 
production base, as a sophisticated growth market, especially for mobile communications and 
digital consumer devices, and as a new source of R&D and innovation (Ernst, forthcoming). 
Both forces combine to produce increasingly complex processes of regionalization. Economic 
interactions within the region, such as trade, investment and competitive strategies, have moved 
beyond a “short causal” chain, where causes and effects are easy to disentangle, and where it is 
2 possible to name names and to develop effective responses.
3 Identifying, monitoring, let alone 
“controlling” the transformational actors and mechanisms by nationality has become much more 
tricky. 
Part 1 introduces a few conceptual building-blocks that we need to capture the interactions 
between international business organization and regionalization. Part 2 describes the growing 
dependence of Japan’s electronics industry on Asia, and explores how Japanese electronics firms 
are searching for ways to expand and upgrade their regional production networks, with China as 
the main prize. Part 3 examines constraints to change. I highlight peculiar features of the 
Japanese network management model in East Asia that once may have reflected strength. But 
now these very same features have turned into systemic weaknesses, as they constrain the 
capacity of Japanese firms to cope with and shape East Asia’s increasingly complex processes of 
regionalization. The chapter concludes with an illustrative example of how some Japanese 
electronics firms are seeking to turn around gradually their EAPNs, by developing strategic 
alliances with emerging new industry leaders in Asia, primarily from Greater China.  
 
1. Global Production Networks and Regionalization 
“Regionalization” can be defined as the integration, across national borders, but within a 
macro-region, of markets for goods, capital, services, knowledge, and labor. Barriers to 
integration continue to exist of course in different markets (especially for low-wage labor), so 
integration is far from perfect. But there is no doubt that a massive integration has taken place 
across East Asian borders that, only a short while ago, seemed to be impenetrable (Ng and Yeats, 
2003). This raises the question: Who are the “integrators”?  
Research on East Asian regionalization has argued that, while states obviously play an 
important role in reshaping institutions and regulations, the dominant integrators have been 
corporations. Much of the literature has focused on the battle between “Japanization” and 
3 “Americanization” as the main drivers of regionalization. But there is little agreement on the 
precise features of business organization that differentiate the comparative capacities of Japanese 
and American firms to shape regionalization.  
Unfortunately, there is very little theoretical work on this relationship: we still lack a unified 
theory of regionalization and international business organization. However, we can build on 
research that links theories of trade and FDI and theories of global production networks.
4 This 
research shows that corporate strategies, organization and investment decisions shape trade 
patterns and the spatial division of labor of economic activities, as well as transfer of technology 
and knowledge diffusion (Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998). Corporations may also indirectly affect 
regionalization by lobbying states to change institutions and regulations. The driving force is 
competition (Ernst, 2002a). In knowledge-intensive industries like electronics, intense price 
competition needs to be combined with product differentiation, in a situation where continuous 
price wars erode profit margins. Of critical importance, however, is speed-to-market: getting the 
right product to the largest volume segment of the market right on time can provide huge profits. 
Being late can be a disaster, and may even drive a firm out of business. The result has been an 
increasing uncertainty and volatility, and a destabilization of established market leadership 
positions  
No firm, not even a dominant market leader, can generate all the different capabilities 
internally that are necessary to cope with the requirements of global competition. Competitive 
success thus critically depends on “vertical specialization”: a capacity to selectively source 
specialized capabilities outside the firm that can range from simple contract assembly to quite 
sophisticated design capabilities. This requires a shift from individual to increasingly collective 
forms of organization, from the multidivisional (M-form) functional hierarchy (Chandler, 1977) 
of “multinational corporations” to the networked global flagship model. Trade economists have 
recently discovered the importance of changes in the organization of international production as 
4 a determinant of trade patterns (for example, Feenstra, 1998; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001). 
Their work demonstrates that (i) production is increasingly ‘fragmented’, with parts of the 
production process being scattered across a number of countries, hence increasing the share of 
trade in parts and components; (ii) that there is reintegration through global production networks 
(GPNs); and (iii) that countries and regions which have been able to become a part of these 
network are the ones which have industrialized the fastest.  
This chapter builds on this work, but uses a broader concept that emphasizes four 
characteristics of GPNs that influence regionalization (Ernst, 2003b, 2002b, 1997): i) scope: 
GPNs encompass all stages of the value chain, not just production, but also sales, procurement, 
outsourcing, and R&D; ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over network resources and 
decision-making; iii) knowledge diffusion: the sharing of knowledge is the necessary glue that 
keeps these networks growing (Ernst and Kim, 2002); and iv) information systems: the 
increasing use of digital information systems to manage these networks enhances not only 
information exchange, but also provides new opportunities for the sharing and joint creation of 
knowledge. 
A Japanese Asian production network covers both intra-firm and inter-firm transactions and 
forms of coordination: it links together the flagship´s own subsidiaries, affiliates and joint 
ventures with its subcontractors, suppliers, service providers, as well as partners in strategic 
alliances. A network flagship like Hitachi or Sony breaks down the value chain into a variety of 
discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be carried out most effectively, where 
they improve the firm’s access to resources, capabilities and knowledge, and where they are 
needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. It is important to emphasize that 
the chain of causation appears to work both ways: changes in the organization of Japanese 
EAPNs have led to changes in East Asia’s trade patterns and investment allocation; those 
changes in turn give rise to further changes in the organization of the above networks. 
5  
2. Expanding and Upgrading Links with East Asia 
Japan has experienced a long-term decline in its share in global trade and FDI during the 
1990s, the country’s “lost decade”. Its share in global exports fell to 7.6% in 2000, after peaking 
at 10.2% in 1986 (JETRO, 2002: fig. V-3). In 1992, Japan’s outward FDI stock was 12.4% of the 
world total, second only to the US, but by 2000 it had fallen back to eighth, the same position it 
had occupied in 1980.
5 Moreover, after being the world’s largest source of outward FDI flows in 
1990, Japan dropped to seventh place in 2001. 
Yet, since the turn of the century, a reversal of Japan’s declining global presence has 
occurred, primarily driven by an expansion of trade and investment links with East Asia. From a 
peak of almost 22% in fy 1997, the overseas production ratio (OPR)
6 of Japanese manufacturing 
firms had declined until fy 1999. Since then, there has been a steady increase to more than 24% 
in fy 2001, with projections of an increase to almost 32% in fy 2005 (JBICI, 2003: 13). The 
electronics industry leads, with an estimated OPR in fy 2002 of almost 41%, up from 38% one 
year earlier. East Asia is the main destination of this expansion of overseas operations of 
Japanese corporate capital in the electronics industry. I will describe the growing dependence of 
Japan’s electronics industry on Asia, and explore how Japanese electronics firms are searching 
for ways to expand and upgrade their regional production networks, with a particular focus on 
China. 
 
2.1. Growing Dependence on East Asia 
Japan’s electronics industry critically depends on East Asia. Over time, this dependency has 
deepened, and it also has become much more complex and multi-faceted. Of primary importance 
has been the region’s role as a global export production platform. Since the catalytic shock of the 
1985 Plaza agreement, when the Yen appreciation inflated Japan’s production costs, Japanese 
6 firms have relocated manufacturing to lower-labor-cost locations in Asia, first in Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, then in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. China’s 
role as Japan’s global low-cost export platform production base has substantially increased over 
the last decade. In fy 2002, almost two thirds of the overseas manufacturing bases of Japanese 
manufacturing firms that have responded to the JBIC surveys were concentrated in East Asia, up 
from 60% in fy 2000 b(JBICI, 2003).
7  
Initially, the focus has been on consumer electronics and home appliances, as well as related 
components. Yet, over the last few years, there has been a substantial diversification in the 
product mix that Japanese firms produce in Asia, to include both hardware and software required 
for computing, communication and industrial applications. At the same time, increasingly 
complex stages of production and overall supply chain management have gradually been 
relocated from Japan to  Asian locations. This upgrading is a response to the intensifying 
competition that Japanese electronics firms face both from above and from below.  
From above, American electronics industry leaders have raced ahead in the most prized areas 
of technological innovation, as far as these can be measured by patent statistics. The US 
“innovation score” has more than doubled from 41 (in 1985) to almost 101 (in 2002), a rate far 
better than for any other country
8 (CHI/MIT 2003). In 2002, all 15 leading companies with the 
best record on patent citations were based in the US, with nine of them in the electronics 
industry. Japan has maintained its second place, with an increase in its “innovation score” from 
15 to 33, but it is now further trailing behind the US. And European industry leaders both in 
telecommunications and in consumer electronics have strengthened their market position by 
aggressively partnering with Asian companies, especially from China. 
From below, Japanese electronics firms are facing new competitors from six Asian countries 
(China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and India) that have emerged as the new center of 
gravity in global electronics exports (Ernst, 2004a). China has now become the third largest 
7 exporter of electronics products (up from 10
th in 2000), and the second largest importer (up from 
7
th in 2000). Taiwan ranks as the #1 global world market supplier for 14 electronics products. 
This includes silicon foundry services (involving leading-edge wafer fabrication) with a 73% 
share in global production value; wireless local area networks, and digital audio-video equipment 
like CD-ROM and DVD, with most of these devices being produced in China. Similar dominant 
world market positions exist for Korea (in computer memories, flat-panel displays and mobile 
phones), Singapore (storage devices, printers), and China (computers and peripherals and digital 
consumer devices) (Ernst, 2004b). Furthermore, while India has failed to excel as a global 
manufacturing exporter, the country has firmly established itself as a global export production 
base for software and information services. 
An equally important aspect of Japan’s growing dependence on East Asia are demand-side 
factors, i.e. the growing sophistication of Asian markets for electronic products and services.
9 
Gone are the days when Asia’s protected markets were an easy dumping-ground for low-end and 
mature products, locally produced by Japanese affiliates (the “mini-Matsushitas”). Procurement 
by Japanese subsidiaries in Asia has created a thriving market for Japanese exports of parts and 
components, and capital equipment (Ernst, 2000). The development of rapidly growing 
electronics industries has further expanded the region’s demand for such input imports. Over 
time, however, the procurement of Japanese subsidiaries and Asian firms has become less Japan-
centered, substituting imports from Japan with purchases from within the region. Over the last 
decade, Japanese firms in Asia have substantially increased their localization of sales and 
procurement (METI, 2002: 10). 
To some degree, this reflects the relocation of production by Japanese component suppliers to 
Asia, as part of an increasingly sophisticated division of labor within Japanese EAPNs (Ernst and 
Ravenhill, 2000). One important result is that the sales of Asian subsidiaries now outpace 
Japan’s exports to Asia: in fy 2000, Asian subsidiaries recorded sales of Y 36,400 billion, 1.7 
8 times the value of Japan’s exports to Asia (Takeuchi 2003: 13). An equally important cause for 
the regionalization of procurement by Japanese subsidiaries in Asia has been the emergence of 
highly competitive suppliers of manufacturing services in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore,  Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and more recently China (Ernst, 2003a).  
In addition, Japanese electronics firms now belatedly realize the critical importance of Asia’s 
thriving and increasingly sophisticated consumer markets. The contraction of Japan’s domestic 
retail markets for home appliances, audio-video equipment, as well as computing and 
communication devices provides a powerful incentive for developing aggressive market 
penetration strategies in Asia (JETRO, 2003: 19). In 2002, total consumer spending in East Asia 
was estimated to be $ 1,461.0 billion. China’s share was almost 40%, up from 27.5% in 
1991.The region’s middle and upper class market, the primary target of global competition, is 
estimated to comprise around 140 million people, roughly 10% of East Asia’s total population. 
The four NIEs (Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) dominate these high-end 
sophisticated consumer markets, but China, with almost 41 million high end consumers, 
accounts for almost 30%  of the region’s higher income market.
10  
Probably the most important change is the growing sophistication of China’s markets for 
electronic products and services. China is now the world’s biggest market for 
telecommunications equipment (wired & wireless), the third largest market for semiconductors, 
and one of the largest and most sophisticated markets for digital consumer and computing 
devices. Major global market leaders count on a continuous rapid growth of the China market to 
reduce the negative impact of the persistent demand stagnation in global electronics markets. 
This is true for the telecommunications market where Japanese producers of infrastructure 
equipment (Fujitsu and NEC) and mobile phones (Matushita, Sharp, Sanyo, Sony, Kyocera) are 
intensely competing as well as collaborating with global industry leaders (e.g., Motorola, 
Alcatel, Nokia, Cisco, Samung, Siemens, Ericsson, and LG), and where all of them are 
9 competing for market share with emerging local giants, such as Huawei, ZTE, Datang, TCL, 
Haier and Ningbo Bird. Global industry leaders are also eager to penetrate China’s markets for 
computing and consumer devices and key components like semiconductors.  
As we will see below, Japanese electronics firms have not been particularly successful in 
penetrating these markets, and competition has become extremely intense. For the profitable 
high-end markets, main competitors are Korean (Samsung and LG) and European consumer 
electronics firms (Philips, Siemens), as well as American computer companies, like HP, Dell, as 
well as Apple and Gateway, who are now entering at a vengeance the digital consumer market. 
Competition is even more intense at the mid- and low-level market segments, where in addition 
to the afore-mentioned firms, Chinese firms and their Taiwanese partners play an increasingly 
important role. In practically all of these market segments across the region, Japanese firms are 
on the defensive and are now belatedly trying to repair the damage of earlier inaction. 
 
2.2. Priorities for Future Network Expansion and Upgrading 
To benefit from the growing importance of East Asia, Japanese electronics firms are now 
searching for ways to expand and upgrade their EAPNs. The emphasis is on attempts to fine-tune 
the division of labor between domestic and overseas production, and to reduce reliance on 
traditional “keiretsu-type” linkages with other Japanese firms. This shift in strategy is driven 
primarily by the need to expand market share in attractive Asian markets, especially in China and 
Northeast Asia, and the quest for scale economies that are necessary to cope with intense price 
competition from emerging new competitors from within the region. 
This is a belated attempt by corporate headquarters to transfer to Asia basic changes in the 
Japanese business model. Of particular importance are attempts to move away from market share 
expansion to profitability as the main measure of success, and attempts to strengthen vertical 
specialization, by outsourcing non-core activities. These changes in the Japanese business model 
10 have been debated at headquarters since the mid-1990s. Yet the green light for implementing 
such changes in Asia was only given five years later, when the slowdown in the electronics 
industry gave rise to intensified competition and reduced profits.
11  
Between 2003 and 2005, Japanese manufacturing firms expect to pursue the following 
priorities in the expansion of their EAPNs (JBICI, 2003: 28, 29). China stands out with a focus 
on expanding production (almost 73% out of 518 responses). ASEAN-4 has an equally high 
focus on expanding production (70% out of 341 responses).
12 But while in China  this includes 
investment in new production lines, the focus in ASEAN-4 is almost exclusively on expanding 
and upgrading existing facilities. In NIEs, expansion of production plays a much less important 
role, with sales expansion being the dominant concern. In China, Japanese firms also assign a 
high priority to the expansion of sales functions (almost 60% of the respondents). 
Particularly noteworthy is the low priority assigned by Japanese firms to an expansion of 
R&D in Asia. This contrasts with the approach of US and European, as well as Korean and 
Taiwanese companies, who are expanding R&D functions in their overseas affiliates in Asia 
(Choi, 2003; Liu and Chen, 2003). In Asia, the share of Japanese companies that intend to 
expand R&D hovers between 9% (for NIEs) to 13.5% (for China), compared to 19% for the EU 
and almost 23% in North America. This indicates that Japanese firms apparently continue to 
neglect the huge potential of Greater China and Korea as lower-cost sources of knowledge 
workers. Japanese firms, in their attempts to upgrade their Asian networks, still typically try to 
retain an unequal division of labor that keeps the development and production of leading-edge 
and high value-added products and production stages in Japan. They also try to minimize 
possible leakages of technological knowledge. But, as we will see below, their capacity to 
sustain this “flying geese” pattern of specialization has been critically weakened. 
This provides yet another example of the slow pace of response of Japan’s major integrated 
electronics companies. In descending order of asset size, the industry leaders are: Hitachi, Sony, 
11 Matsushita Electric, Toshiba, NEC, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, Sanyo and Sharp. With massive 
overseas sales and extensive global production networks, these nine firms once embodied 
Japan’s global leadership in the electronics industry. With a combined turnover of Y 46 trillion 
(ca. $ 380 billion), a total workforce of 1.4 million, hundreds of subsidiaries and thousands of 
component suppliers around the world, adjustments in strategy and organization only come about 
incrementally. 
This is different for Japanese small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), most of them 
specialized suppliers of electronic components, who can respond much faster than the global 
Japanese flagship companies. These SMEs are the main drivers behind the current expansion of 
production into East Asia. For SMEs, this is a question of survival - smaller Japanese component 
suppliers are most directly affected by the increasing competition from Asian suppliers. In fy 
2002, almost 88% of suppliers of electronics components were planning to expand their overseas 
production networks over the next three years, compared to less than 73% of final assemblers 
(most of them global flagships). And Japanese SMEs in the electronics industry have a record 
OPR of 45%, way above the average OPR for all industries of slightly below 32% (JBICI 2003: 
67).  
The rapid internationalization of Japan’s domestic supplier base in the electronics industry 
indicates that the widely feared “hollowing-out”
13 has hit smaller specialized suppliers especially 
hard. This is borne out by the finding of the fy 2002 JBICI survey (2003: 16ff) that, compared to 
earlier surveys, fewer companies in the electronics industry intend to invest in an upgrading of 
domestic operations. Japanese electronics firms may thus lose one of their major traditional 
strengths, a vibrant and flexible domestic base of supplier industries.
14  
Larger global players on the other hand are under tremendous pressure to combine the 
expansion of production in Asia with a vigorous upgrading of their domestic production and 
innovation systems. Laying-off workers in Japan is costly, as retrenched workers must be 
12 adequately compensated to enable companies to maintain their reputations as good employers. 
This implies that wages are a de facto component of fixed costs. To sustain jobs especially for 
expensive knowledge workers, Japanese large firms attempt to sustain an unequal division of 
labor with Asia. They attempt to keep basic and applied research at home, plus “design work 
which promotes added-value, and basic programming development”, while product and system 
customization plus process adaptation are developed in major overseas markets like the Asian 
NIEs and China (JBICI, 2003: 21). 
 
3. Constraints to Change: Systemic Weaknesses 
To establish why Japanese electronics firms find it difficult to implement the above priorities 
for future network expansion and upgrading, I highlight five peculiar features of the Japanese 
network management model in East Asia that once may have reflected strength but now have 
turned into systemic weaknesses: persistent diversity of organization; dispersed location driven 
by risk minimization; Japan-centered sales destination and a neglect of local market 
characteristics; a limited capacity to tap the creativity of non-Japanese skilled workers, engineers 
and managers; and a reluctance to outsource R&D. 
 
3.1. Partial Convergence and Persistent Diversity 
Responding to the resurgence of the U.S. electronics industry during the “New Economy” 
boom, both the leading global Japanese flagship companies, but also smaller companies like 
Kyocera, have attempted to emulate what they perceived to be successful strategies by their 
American counterparts. Imitation has been an important force of change. Yet, imitation has not 
transformed Japanese companies and their EAPNs into clones of their American benchmark 
models. Instead it has generated “ a complex process of hybridization where partial convergence 
coexists with persistent diversity” (Ernst and Ravenhill, 2000: 242).
15 
13 Convergence occurred in the mix of products that are produced in Asia. By the mid 1990s, 
Japanese firms had joined their U.S. counterparts in moving a substantial portion of personal 
computer production to the region. Japanese firms have also jumped onto the bandwagon of 
OEM contracts that provided substantial competitive advantages to American computer 
companies.
16 Similarly, American firms were the first to take advantage of the growing 
concentrations of expertise in various areas of electronics production in East Asia by transferring 
increasing responsibility for engineering and electronic design to subsidiaries (Ernst, 2004a). 
Again, this has proved to be a cost-effective strategy that some Japanese firms were beginning to 
emulate since the mid-1990s. The new responsibilities devolved to Japanese subsidiaries have 
inevitably required changes in management practices that have brought them closer to their 
American counterparts (Ernst, 2000).  
 
Figure 1: Japan’s Integration into the Global Economy 
 
Yet, important differences persist in the organization of Japanese EAPNs. An important 
reason for this persistent diversity is that Japan continues to lag behind the US in its integration 
into the global economy (Fig.1). This truncated integration into global economy constrains any 
convergence of Japanese networks to the US model. As long as Japan continues to trail behind in 
its overseas production ratios and especially in its net direct investment income, Japanese firms 
will remain under pressure to minimize risks by centralizing management control in the parent 
company, and by relying heavily on the parent and other long-standing partners for the supply of 
capital goods and components. 
 
3.2. Dispersed Location  
14 Until the mid 1980s, affiliates of Japanese electronics firms were more geographically   
dispersed across Asia than American ones, due to their primary focus on protected local markets. 
Once the focus shifted to export-platform production, locational patterns converged: both 
Japanese and American electronics firms invested heavily in mega-plants in a few industrial sites 
in Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand. Since the turn of the century, attempts to be more 
selective have gained momentum. Japanese firms are now attempting to gain scale economies 
through consolidation of investment in China, and to catch up with global competitors in the 
penetration of the China market.  
A huge investment gap however remains in the China market between US, European and 
Korean companies on the one hand and Japanese companies on the other. The first group has 
focused on consolidating in China much of its global production, serving both the Chinese and 
global markets, and hence maximizing both economies of scale and scope. In contrast, as a share 
of Japan’s accumulated stock of FDI, China still lags substantially behind Asian NIEs and 
ASEAN 4 (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Japanese FDI Stock, by destination, 2002, $bn 
In China, Japanese electronics firms have invested in production much earlier than the first 
group of companies, but they were constrained, because the Chinese government did not allow 
foreign firms to invest in the final-product manufacturing of electronics products, except for a 
few export-oriented joint ventures, primarily by Hitachi and Sanyo (Marukawa, 2002: 184- 
187).
17 This is why, during the “China fever” between 1991 and 1995, Japanese electronics firms 
in China concentrated on the production of key components for the consumer electronics 
industry. By providing key components like CRTs, compressors and ICs to Chinese set makers, 
and by assisting their IC design, Japanese firms supported the development of technological 
capabilities by Chinese firms that are now industry leaders, like Haier, Konka, TCL and others.  
15 Japanese electronics firms, however, were unable to enjoy first-comers’ advantages, such as 
Shanghai Volkswagen did for cars, and they failed to establish strong positions in China’s final 
product markets. This is true even for consumer electronics, a market that Japanese firms 
dominate in Southeast Asia. It thus made perfect economic sense for Japanese firms to sustain a 
dual production base both in Southeast Asia and in China. Today, this dispersion of production 
networks across Asia has become a major disadvantage, as it prevents Japanese firms from 
reaping cost-reducing scale economies in China.  
Attempts to shift the center of gravity of Japanese EAPNs from ASEAN to China are 
constrained by a deeply entrenched history of Japanese management trying to shelter the 
company from risks and uncertainties (Tachiki, 1999:186).
18 Japanese firms are concerned that 
once they move most of their investment into China, their profitability will suffer, as they 
become unduly dependent on an array of perceived disadvantages and risks of investing in 
China. A major concern is that the legal framework and the tax system are opaque, and that both 
are prone to frequent, sudden and unpredictable changes. Equally important are concerns about 
the absence of effective intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, difficulties to raise local 
investment funds, and delays in the collection of account receivables, while Japanese firms are 
requested to settle accounts immediately. Japanese electronics firms are also concerned about an 
industry structure that gives rise to “excessive” competition and periodic over-heating, and a 
tendency to shirk WTO regulations and to introduce hidden non-tariff barriers (JBICI, 2003: 34).  
A fourth major area of concern relates to the availability of local managers and engineers and 
labor relations. Japanese electronics firms are concerned that the rising cost of managers and 
engineers in China may soon reduce the cost advantage relative to other locations in Asia.
19 
Frequent complaints are about high employee turnover, low level of basic factory skills, and 
conflicts about wage level gaps between Japanese staff and Chinese workers. Because of these 
perceived difficulties and risks, Japanese electronics firms typically are very reluctant to move 
16 from dispersed Asian production networks to concentrated networks within China. Risk 
minimization in other words limits the pursuit of vertical specialization, and this sets Japanese 
companies apart from their American and European counterparts.  
But recently there are signs of a possible reversal: Japanese FDI into China, which had 
stagnated in value since fy 1995, has increased again for the first time in fy 2000 (JETRO 2002b: 
35).
20 Since then, Japanese FDI inflows into China have accelerated, rising almost 60% in 2001, 
to $ 4.6 billion, the highest level ever. And during the first six months of 2002, Japanese firms 
invested an additional $ 3.15 billion (JBICI 2003).
21 Like during the first “China Fever” in 1992, 
the Yen appreciation has acted as a powerful catalyst. However, there are now additional 
attractions, such as: substantial improvements in infrastructure and logistics, at least in China’s 
three main growth poles; the signaling effect of China’s WTO accession; the emergence of 
support industry clusters; and vast improvements in the quality of human resources, especially 
China’s ca. 700,000 annual science and engineering graduates.  
 
3.3. Sales Destination - Neglect of Asian Markets  
A third persistent difference can be found in the contrasting sales destination of Japanese and 
American EAPNs (Takeuchi 2001). While Japanese electronics companies have moved from 
sales to local markets to third country exports, and now to reverse importing into Japan, 
American companies have moved in the opposite direction: from a primary focus on reverse 
imports into the U.S: to an increasing emphasis on sales in Asia. Throughout the 1990s, a 
defining characteristic of Japanese EAPNs in the electronics industry has been the rapid rise of 
reverse imports into Japan - more than 60% of Japan’s imports from Asia are imports from 
Japanese subsidiaries (METI, 2002).   
By the turn of the century, Asia has replaced the U.S. as the main source of Japanese imports 
for computers, semiconductors and electronic components. For semiconductors, Japan’s import 
17 dependence ratio
22 grew rapidly from below 20% in 1991 to around 50% in 1999. This was 
primarily due to foundry contracts and contract manufacturing arrangements for semiconductors, 
primarily with Taiwanese and Singaporean firms. By 2000, Asia accounted for over 60% of  
Japan’s semiconductor imports, while the share of the U.S. had fallen to around 30%. This has 
resulted in a dramatic reversal of Japan’s trade balance with Asia in the electronics industry from 
surplus into deficit.  
The Japan-centered sales destination has resulted in another major weakness of Japanese 
EAPNs: a lack of aggressive strategic marketing to address the specific requirements of East 
Asian markets (e.g., Meyer-Ohle and Hirasawa, 2000). Japanese firms are on the defensive in 
practically all important electronic market segments across Asia, and they are now belatedly 
searching for ways to repair the damage of earlier inaction. Throughout Asia, and especially in 
China, Japanese electronics firms have failed to develop and exploit unique market positions. In 
consumer electronics for instance, Japanese majors like Sony and Matsushita have been caught 
in price wars with the dominant local players, while in the high-end markets, they are lagging 
behind Korean and European set makers, like Samsung, LG and Philips. And for computing and 
communication devices, Japanese firms seem to be in a sandwich. On the one hand they have 
difficulties advancing into the new product, software and service markets developed by US 
leaders, e.g. the Internet, e-business, advanced microprocessors, and operating systems for an 
increasing variety of digital devices.  On the other hand, for price-sensitive devices, like laptops 
and mobile phones, Japanese firms are been squeezed by global brand leaders from the US, 
Europe and Korea, who are outsourcing manufacturing and design to low-cost EMS and ODM 
suppliers, as well as by Chinese set-makers who can gain access to latest product technology, say 
for smart phones, by licensing reference designs and so-called silicon intellectual properties 
(SIPs), i.e. building blocks that facilitate SOC (system-on-chip) design (Ernst, 2004b). 
18 In China specifically, Japanese electronics firms need to differentiate themselves from their 
increasingly important Asian (primarily Korean and Chinese) competitors. Debates on how to 
improve their market position emphasize that it is necessary to “ maintain non-price 
competitiveness in areas where differentiation is possible in terms of technology and know-how” 
(Konomoto 2002: 8). But to achieve this will not be easy. Take China’s mobile communications 
market which has experienced exponential growth, tripling in value between 1998 and 2002. 
Reflecting China’s WTO membership obligations, foreign companies can establish joint ventures 
in China as of January 2003, for mobile phones, data communications, fixed telephones, and 
international telephone services. Furthermore, China’s government is expected to introduce 3G 
mobile phone service during 2005.  
To succeed in China’s telecommunications market, global companies must be willing to share 
their accumulated experience in providing “integrated solutions” for complex technology 
systems. According to Davies et al (2001:5), “integrated solutions” encompass four sets of 
capabilities: (1) system integration: to design and integrate components and subsystems into a 
system; (2) operational services: to maintain, finance, renovate and operate systems through the 
life cycle; (3) business consulting: to understand a customer’s business and to offer advice and 
solutions that address a customer’s specific needs; and (4) finance: to provide a customer with 
help in purchasing new capital-intensive systems and in managing a customer’s installed base of 
capital assets. By and large, US and European electronics firms have sophisticated and proven 
strategies in place that can provide these four critical support services. 
Japanese firms (both equipment vendors and service providers) lag well behind their rivals 
from the US and Europe in the penetration of China’s communications markets. For instance, 
NEC and Matsushita Communications Industrial have established a joint venture to develop 3G 
mobile handsets at the end of 2001. But as this venture was about to become operational during 
2003, price competition had already drastically increased for mobile handsets. Intense price 
19 competition is driven primarily by purely Chinese manufacturers like Ningbo Bird, TCL, Legend 
and others who can provide low-cost handsets, based on key components and reference designs 
that they have licensed from global platform leaders like Ericsson, Texas Instruments and 
Philips. In short, Japanese firms may have again missed the opportunity to reap first mover 
windfall profits. 
There are various reasons why Japanese firms thus far have made little headway in 
penetrating China’s emerging “systems solutions” markets. Probably of greatest importance are 
constraints imposed by the Japanese production system that prevent Japanese electronics firms 
from sharing “integrated solutions” capabilities. As convincingly demonstrated by Yoshihara 
(2000:67 and 68), Japanese parent companies typically insist on an (almost) exact replication of 
plant layout, quality control and management routines in overseas subsidiaries, and they exercise 
tight control over capabilities required for “integrated solutions.” This unwillingness to share the 
basic ingredients of the Japanese production system with outsiders has become a major 
stumbling block for Japanese penetration strategies into the China market. 
 
3.4. Human Resources Management 
Human resources management (HRM) used to be considered a major advantage of the 
Japanese business model (e.g., Dore, 1986; Aoki, 1988; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Fruin, 
1997). Somewhat ironically, it has now become an important weakness. No other factor arguably 
constrains Japanese electronics firms in East Asia more than their very limited capacity to 
recruit, develop and benefit from non-Japanese skilled workers, engineers and managers. In 
China, for instance, European and American firms put enormous energy and money into training 
Chinese staff and promoting them on the corporate ladder. Japanese companies have instead bred 
“China experts” - Japanese fluent in Chinese who have studied Chinese business practice and 
20 behavior. These Japanese managers maintain a firm grip on business and keep their Chinese 
colleagues at a distance. 
Typically, Japanese companies manage their Asian subsidiaries in a top-down, bureaucratic 
way. The main objective is to make sure that the subsidiary responds faithfully to orders from 
Japan, which requires hard task master managers. Existing organizational structures and 
incentives do not help to breed initiative and innovation. Such a top-down HRM approach 
worked, as long as the main objective was to exploit low labor costs. Typically, Asian 
subsidiaries produced lower-end, commodity-type products to a given design, and they provided 
a narrower range of products and services than in Japan. As a result, it was relatively easy for 
Japanese expatriate managers to convey the wishes of headquarters’ management to the shop 
floor. The main task was to achieve results, and there was not much need to listen to local 
subordinates. This system however provides very little flexibility: without the Japanese 
expatriates, the subsidiaries cannot function. As Japanese managers make most decisions among 
themselves, they “often find themselves making decisions based on hearsay (e.g., about what 
strategies rivals may have adopted) and guesses (e.g., about what customers may be thinking).” 
(Konomoto, 2000: 9).
23  
I experienced a vivid example of this system during an interview in November 2002 with the 
general manager of a subsidiary of one of the largest Japanese electronics conglomerates in 
China. As he spoke only Japanese, he brought along two interpreters, one to translate between 
Japanese and English, to communicate with me, and one interpreter to communicate with his 
Chinese middle managers (altogether six representing the main functions of the subsidiary, like 
sales, production, quality control, R&D, procurement). Under these conditions, communication 
was not easy, and required a quite extraordinary amount of concentration on all sides, in order to 
avoid a Babylonian mix-up. Fortunately enough, the Japanese GM was mild-mannered and 
good-humored. But what was supposed to be a standard 1 ½ hours interview, required almost 
21 three hours. Even then, we had not achieved what we wanted to discuss, but all participants 
agreed to end the interview, due to sheer exhaustion.  
Such communication barriers are ever present in Japanese subsidiaries in Asia: “the cultural 
and linguistic gap between expatriate Japanese managers and local employees has obscured the 
latter’s true feelings from the former” (Konomoto, 2000: 10), giving rise to misunderstandings 
and mutual recriminations. This has had a negative impact on local staff morale. In addition, 
obscure selection criteria for choosing local senior managers, and persistent “glass ceilings” for 
non-Japanese managers de-motivate local employees - “veteran employees arrange with each 
other to do the minimum amount of work necessary and wait for instructions rather than 
volunteer suggestions” (Konomoto, 2000: 6). Japanese subsidiaries are especially weak in 
motivating higher-skilled local employees with scarce skills: ”The greater the educational 
qualifications of employees…, the more they tended to be dissatisfied with the company’s merit 
orientation.” (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, higher-skilled employees tend to search for a quick return, 
especially in the highly competitive skilled labor markets of China.  
An important reason for these communication barriers is that headquarters management in 
Japan fails to examine the motivations of local managers and engineers that shape the corporate 
culture of Japanese subsidiaries. This gives rise to a vicious circle. Because of an unwillingness 
to promote local managers to top positions and because of the operation of a seniority system 
that inhibits rapid promotion, Japanese companies have found it difficult to recruit and retain 
quality managers and engineers in their Asian subsidiaries. Japanese managers typically argue 
that they cannot feel confident about increasing the role of local management, “because the skill 
level of locally recruited managers is low.”(JBICI, 2001: 68). They continue to have great 
difficulties in Asia in recruiting top technical talents and local managers. Linguistic barriers are 
one important reason: the capacity to speak Japanese is often a basic prerequisite for hiring local 
managers, but Asian managers prefer to learn English.
24 
22 Another reason is the negative image of Japanese firms as employers of skilled labor. Surveys 
have shown that most Asian managers consider working conditions and promotion opportunities 
in U.S. subsidiaries to be far more favorable, placing Japanese subsidiaries at a competitive 
disadvantage. The rapid expansion of the electronics industry in Asian has offered high caliber 
personnel the opportunity for movement among employers. Extensive “job-hopping” is the name 
of the game, a phenomenon that Japanese corporations have found alien.  
To address this problem, Japanese electronics firms have adopted a strategy of in-house 
training of their engineers. Based on a careful selection process, an affiliate in Asia develops a 
pool of highly motivated operators which they then train over a period of five to seven years to 
become (sometimes unlicensed) engineers. In this manner, engineering skills are made firm-
specific, reducing the likelihood of job-hopping behavior.
25 The disadvantage however is that 
this requires a lot of time. Most importantly, this reliance on “internal recruitment” gives rise to 
an increasingly serious failure to compete for the best local management and engineering talents 
across the region who could provide new ideas and a fresh commitment to upgrade Japanese 
EAPNs. 
Japanese electronics firms recognize that they must drastically change their human resources 
management (HRM) practices in East Asia. They are searching for ways to catch up with more 
open, flexible and decentralized HRM approaches of global industry leaders, including those of 
Korean and Taiwanese competitors. Japanese firms know that without such changes in HRM, 
“any competition strategy they have will prove ineffective.” (Konomoto, 2000: 1). After years of 
hesitation, Japanese firms are now eager to tap into East Asia’s huge pool of lower-cost 
managers and engineers to facilitate and accelerate decision-making, and to cope with the frantic 
pace of change in Asian business practices, values and ways of thinking (JETRO, 2003: 33).  
Necessary changes in HRM include the introduction of transparent performance evaluation 
criteria, adapted to local routines and labor market regulations,  and career perspectives that 
23 match those of competing US, European and Asian firms. Above all, local staff needs to become 
an integral part in the decision-making process and in the search for problem solutions. 
Furthermore, local managers need to be groomed for and transferred to global positions, like for 
instance Motorola does when it sends the general manager of its Penang subsidiary to manage its 
newly established Chinese facilities.
26 This high inter-firm and geographic mobility of local 
senior managers that work for US global network flagships contrasts with the Japanese approach 
of promoting the intra-firm transfer of  (overwhelmingly) Japanese managers. 
 
3.5. R&D Management 
Before the mid 1990s, Japanese corporations undertook little R&D in their East Asian 
subsidiaries. This contrasts with U.S. subsidiaries whose parents increasingly delegated to them 
responsibility for product design and development, in some instances not just for local but global 
markets (Ernst, 1997). By the turn of the century, R&D continued to play a limited role in the 
EAPNs of Japanese firms, compared to North America and the EU. But as East Asian customers 
become increasingly demanding, Japanese firms can no longer rely on products designed in 
Japan to penetrate Asian markets. Instead, localization of design and engineering is necessary to 
customize products and services, and to accelerate speed of response to changes in demand. 
Successful market penetration in East Asia thus requires a break with established patterns in 
R&D management.  
Yet we have seen that Japanese firms continue to assign a low priority to an expansion of 
R&D in East Asia. This reflects a defensive bias of Japanese R&D management: intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection and restrictions on royalty payments are the predominant 
concern. This is in stark contrast to R&D management in American electronics companies where 
value creation through aggressive commercialization of a company’s intellectual property rights 
now has become the top priority. Leading competitors in the US, Europe and Korea have 
24 aggressively moved ahead with R&D outsourcing to tap into the region’s vast lower-cost pool of 
human resources and specialized skills. Japanese firms thus need to complement IPR protection 
with a consistent strategy to relocating more R&D to major new clusters in East Asia (e.g., 
Walsh, 2003). 
However, after a long period of reluctance, Japanese firms are finally investing in R&D 
centers, both in China and Southeast Asia, and the focus is shifting from product customization 
and process adjustment to chip design and software services.
27 However, retaining control over 
core production technologies remains a dominant concern, reflecting fears that Japan’s 
competitiveness might be eroded by leaking production technologies overseas (JETRO 2003: 
44).
28  This reluctance to penetrate aggressively Asia’s emerging technology markets runs 
counter to important long-term interests of Japanese electronics firms. As Takeuchi (2003: 17) 
demonstrates, Japanese firms need to increase their revenues from both FDI and technology 
licensing, in order to compensate for declining export revenues. Some Japanese industry leaders 
have developed robust leadership positions in key technologies such as system-on-chip design, 
liquid crystal and plasma displays, and nano-technology.
29 This should help them to bear the 
risks of relocating some parts of R&D to East Asia. 
 
4.  Hybridization - Partnering with Asian Companies 
Japanese electronics firms are now searching for ways to readjust their production, 
distribution and innovation networks to cope with the opportunities and challenges resulting 
from the increasingly complex regionalization in a radically changed East Asia. This constitutes 
a fundamental change in Japanese corporate strategy and organization. At long last, Japanese 
electronics firms appear ready to accept that they are no longer capable of imposing an unequal 
“flying geese” division of labor on East Asia. Equally important, the belief in the innate 
superiority of the Japanese business model has become an endangered species - Japanese 
25 electronics firms are all searching to emulate successful features not only of American and 
European rivals, but also of leading Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese firms. For the first time, 
Japanese electronics firms are now also using successful Asian firms, like Samsung, LG, Acer 
(BenQ), Hon Hai, Haier and TCL as benchmark cases to reformulate their regional networking 
strategies. And they are searching for ways to develop strategic partnerships with emerging new 
industry leaders in Asia, most prominently with Chinese companies.  
Some Japanese firms are belatedly following the partnering strategies pioneered by global 
industry leaders like Motorola, Intel, IBM, Cisco, Alcatel, Philips, Siemens, Infineon, but also by 
Korea’s “Big Four” (Samsung, LG, SK Telecom and KT), Singapore’s Temasek, and Taiwan’s 
industry leaders.
30 Particularly instructive is a recent partnerships between Sanyo and Haier 
(announced in January 2002) which shows signs of a radical break with a tradition of unequal 
(“vertical”) forms of collaboration, where the Japanese partner dominates, to a “horizontal” 
relationship among equals. As the first attempt by a major Japanese electronics company to 
establish a comprehensive business alliance with a Chinese industry leader, the Sanyo-Haier 
agreement has been hailed by METI as the new “standard for Japan-China business 
relationships…Rather than antagonizing Chinese players, Japanese businesses should team up 
with them to share profits in mutual markets.”
31 But this agreement has also encountered “an 
enormous number of protest from various sides”,
32 indicating the still substantial resistance of 
Japanese firms against changes in their China strategies.  
The agreement has four components: 1) sales of Sanyo products in China under Sanyo and 
Haier brand names through Haier’s distribution network; 2) sales of Haier products in Japan 
through a joint venture in Japan, with Sanyo owing 60% and Haier 40%; 3) a new Sanyo factory 
to be built next to Haier’s huge refrigerator factory in Tsing Tao, to supply Haier with Sanyo’s 
leading-edge compressors; and, most importantly, 4) technological collaboration across a broad 
range of key components.  
26 For Sanyo, important benefits include a privileged access to Haier’s vast sales network in 
China, the largest of any electronics company.
33 Additional attractions are Haier’s market 
leadership across a broad product portfolio;
34 Haier’s state-of-the-art production system; and 
most importantly, a highly motivated and well-trained workforce (with a high share of engineers 
and managers trained in the US) that is exposed to strictly enforced performance-based 
evaluation and incentives. Sanyo’s CEO, Satoshi Iue (the son of the company’s founder) was 
greatly impressed during an earlier visit to a massive Haier Group plant that is four times larger 
than his own company’s largest factory.
35 He was particularly impressed by Haier’s ability to 
purchase the sort of expensive, leading-edge machinery (primarily from European suppliers) that 
is beyond the reach of Japanese manufacturers, due to their financial difficulties.
36  
For Haier, in turn, the main attraction has been Sanyo’s willingness to market and support its 
products in the Japanese market, an absolute first in the notoriously closed Japanese market. 
Haier understands that it will take time to overcome resistance of Japanese customers, due to the 
persistent “low quality” image of Chinese products. But it expects to use Sanyo’s decision to 
support its products in the famously difficult Japanese market to enhance its brand recognition in 
other markets, including the increasingly demanding Chinese market. Although several leading 
Japanese firms had been courting Haier, it appears that no other company was willing to follow 
Sanyo’s offer of a comprehensive business alliance that includes broad-based technological 
cooperation. 
Arguably the most interesting development is a new sense of urgency on the part of Sanyo 
managers to make a serious effort to overcome communication problems with their Chinese 
counterparts, and to adjust to modern Chinese business practices. Symptomatic is the approach 
taken by the 35-year-old president of the Sanyo Haier joint venture.
37 He admits that this 
comprehensive business alliance is “ a new type of project that Sanyo has no experience with. 
27 Dealing with the Chinese style of business creates problems I’ve never faced before, but… I am 
comfortable with it and enjoy this challenge.” To illustrate this, he tells the following story:  
 
“The Chinese way of starting business is to take orders regardless of their capabilities to 
fill the orders at the time. When they are asked to do something, the Chinese normally 
respond by saying, ‘It can be done.’ This means an absolute commitment in Japan, but, it is 
used in China to express one’s eagerness to do business…In such a situation, the Japanese 
would respond by saying, ‘We’ll take it back to our office to determine whether we can accept 
the job.’ In the beginning, we trusted the Chinese counterpart’s words and began doing our 
part. After a while, we found out our partner could not live up to its part of the agreement. 
That was our mistake - we should have been aware it was the Chinese way of getting orders, 
and we shouldn’t have taken their first response as a full commitment.. I have finally come to 
understand that they are not malicious (underlining added, DE)… I admire the eagerness and 
aggressiveness of the Chinese toward business. The Japanese tend to be too humble and 
uncertain when doing business. The Chinese are more determined, and I think that has led to 
their recent economic growth.” 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that, far from withdrawing from East Asia, Japanese corporate 
capital in the electronics industry now critically depends on the region, not only as a global 
export production base, but also as a major and increasingly sophisticated market for its 
products, services and technology, and as a source of lower-cost knowledge workers. This 
explains why Japanese electronics firms are searching for ways to expand and upgrade their 
regional distribution, production and R&D networks, with a particular focus on China. These 
networks will continue to affect Asian regionalization patterns, but their impact will now differ 
28 from earlier periods. I have shown, for instance, that Japan’s trade links with Asia have shifted 
from surplus to deficit, and that important changes have occurred in the composition of traded 
products. Japanese firms continue to be a major source of components and machinery. They also 
continue to play an important role as providers of shop-floor management techniques for Asian 
suppliers (e.g., quality control and supply chain management). But in many other areas of 
management, Japanese firms now play second fiddle.  
We have seen that Japanese firms are finding it difficult to make the adjustments in 
organization and management that are necessary to expand and upgrade their regional networks. 
I have highlighted five peculiar features of the Japanese network management model in East 
Asia that once may have reflected strength but now have turned into systemic weaknesses: 
persistent diversity of organization; dispersed location driven by risk minimization; Japan-
centered sales destination and a neglect of local market characteristics; a limited capacity to tap 
the creativity of non-Japanese skilled workers, engineers and managers; and a reluctance to 
outsource R&D.  
I have also identified equally important exogenous forces. In the electronics industry, firms of 
diverse nationality compete and collaborate within multi-layered global “networks of networks” 
of marketing, production and innovation. This has forced Japanese firms into dense interaction 
with a multitude of firms from the US as well as from East Asia’s leading electronics exporting 
countries. A second critical exogenous force has been the rise of China as a global export 
production base, as a sophisticated growth market, especially for mobile communications and 
digital consumer devices, and as a new source of R&D and innovation. Both forces have 
produced increasingly complex processes of regionalization. 
The chapter shows that, to cope with the new challenges they are facing in a radically changing 
East Asia, Japanese firms are now beginning to emulate successful features of Korean, 
Taiwanese and Chinese business models. Belatedly, some Japanese firms are now attempting to 
29 develop more equal partnerships with emerging new industry leaders in Asia, primarily from 
Greater China. This “out-lier behavior” may act as a powerful catalyst for change. The key to 
successful alliances with Asian partners is “hybridization” of business organization beyond 
national models, where Japanese firms adopt successful features of East Asian firms. In this 
sense, “Asianization” of production networks may supersede in the longer run the battle between 























Figure 1:  Japan’s Integration into the Global Economy 
 
(%, $billions) 
 Japan  U.S.A.  Germany 
Balance of Overseas Direct 
Investment/GDP 
5.9 25.0 22.7 
Overseas Production Ratio  14.3  30.7  46.8 
Net Direct Production Ratio 
      Income Received 
      Income Paid 
      License Royalties, etc. Received 
















Net Direct Investment Income/GDP  0.1  0.8  0.4 
Net Direct Investment 
Income/Investment Balance 
3.0 6.0  4.0 
Export Reliance  9.7  7.8  26.3 
Import Reliance  7.2  12.4  26.3 
Balance of Inward Direct 
Investment/GDP 
1.1 27.7 23.6 
 
Notes: The figures are actual date for 2000, except for the overseas production ratio for the 
United States, which refers to 1999. 
 








Figure 2: Japanese FDI Stock, by destination, 2002, $bn 
 
NIEs 24.9 
ASEAN – 4  18.78 
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1 The author gratefully acknowledges comments and suggestions from  Peter Katzenstein, Takashi Shiraishi, Miles 
Kahler, Peter Gourevitch, T.J. Pempel, Derek Hall, Terutomo Ozawa, Mike Hobday, Denis Simon, Norio 
Tokumaru, Max von Zedtwitz, Richard Baker, Barry Naughton, and Lu Feng.  
2 Data sources include the annual surveys of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Institute (JBICI) on the 
Overseas Business Operations of Japanese Manufacturing Companies; annual reports by the Ministry of Economics, 
Trade & Industry (METI), JETRO and the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association 
(JEITA), the Nomura Research Institute, the Fujitsu Research Institute, the Japan Research Institute, the Japan 
Electronic Industry Yearbook (Denpa Shinbun, Denshi Kogyo Nenkan), and the Yearbook of World Electronics 
Data; and specialized newsletters, such as the JETRO China Newsletter, Nomura Research Institute (NRI) Papers, 
Oxford Analytica, the Interfax China IT & Telecom Weekly, Electronic Business, Electronics Engineering Times,  
the Semiconductor Reporter, and CMPnet.Asia. 
3 See Derek Hall’s chapter for an analysis of similar developments in renewable resource industries. 
4 Pioneering attempts to establish a unified analysis of FDI and international trade are the technology gap trade 
theory of Posner (1961) and the international product life cycle theory of Vernon (1966 and 1979). Other scholars 
have tried to link the theory of foreign direct investment to that of industrial organization of multinational 
enterprises (e.g., Dunning, 1981, 1993; Ozawa, 2000). 
5 Ministry of Finance date, quoted in JETRO (2002: 25). Note however that MoF data on FDI do not include the 
quite substantial amounts of reinvestments of Japanese subsidiaries in Asia that do not require a capital transfer from 
Japan to the region (e.g., Nakagane, 2002:55). 
6 The “overseas production ratio” of a company is defined as (overseas production volume)/ (overseas production 
volume + domestic production volume) in % (JBICI 2003, note 8). 
7 In 2002, the greatest number of production bases (1,067) was in the ASEAN-4 countries (+ 16% from fy 2000). 
China is second with 890 Japanese manufacturing affiliates ((+ 38% from fy 2000), followed by North America 
(752, + 17%), and Asian NIEs (616, + 16%). This indicates that China has experienced the largest increase in the 
number of Japanese manufacturing affiliates. 
8 The US “innovation score” measures the number of patents granted by the US Patent Office, multiplied by the so-
called “citation index” that indicates the value of these patents The citation index measures the frequency of citation 
of a particular patent. When the US Patent Office publishes patents, each one includes a list of other patents from 
which it is derived. The more often a patent is cited, the more likely it is a pioneering patent, connected with 
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important inventions and discoveries. An index of more than 1 indicates that patents are cited more often than would 
be expected for a specific group of technologies, while less than 1 indicates they are cited less often than expected. 
9 With more than 40% of the overseas sales bases of Japanese manufacturing firms (in fy 2002), East Asia is well 
ahead of the EU and North America (JBICI, 2003). The number of Japanese sales affiliates in Asia increased by 
24% in the two years from fy 2000 to fy 2002, with the largest increase (+30%) in China. (Takeuchi 2003: 2). 
10 There are of course huge geographic disparities. Beijing, the Yangtze delta around Shanghai, and the southern 
coastal provinces have all become leading growth markets, and in some cases even launch markets for digital 
consumer and mobile communication devices. But beyond these thriving high-end markets, persistent poverty keeps 
strangulating effective demand. 
11 As Tachiki (1999) shows, it typically takes Japanese firms around three to five years to translate a change in 
corporate business plans into decisions on the geographic location of resources and to mobilize organizational 
resources that are necessary to relocate overseas production. This reflects the strictly sequential procedure of 
corporate decision-making in Japan: only after a systematic restructuring of the corporate business plan has 
occurred, will management move on to a gradual implementation of changes in overseas operations. 
12 ASEAN-4 includes Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, while NIEs covers Singapore, Taiwan and 
Korea. 
13 “Hollowing-out” is defined as a decline in the manufacturing sector’s contribution to economic activity (e.g., 
output or employment) in the home economy in response to increases in FDI outflows. 
14 Yoshihide Ishiyama’s interesting study (“Is Japan Hollowing Out?”), published in 1999, was apparently too 
optimistic.  He argues (Ishiyama 1999: 242) that “’hollowing-out’ …should not be a concern for Japan… (as)… 
Japan’s manufacturing industry seems to be much more resilient than that of other countries…After a short while, 
Japan’s manufacturing corporations manage to increase efficiency in producing existing products, upgrade products, 
or move to new product lines to defend turf against imports and sustain export revenue.” Since then, this belief in 
Japan’s invincibility has been thoroughly weakened. 
15 The debate about whether there are differences between Japanese and U.S. FDI has a long history. Over time, the 
focus  of analysis has shifted from trade impacts (e.g., Kojima, 1978, 1986), transfer of technology and the 
importance of relative factor endowments (Ozawa, 1979; Urata, 1999) to differences in the way in which Japanese 
and American firms have organized their international business operations, and how these differences affect 
transaction costs, learning and knowledge diffusion (e.g., Westney, 1999; Fruin, 1997). By the late 1990s, a growing 
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literature was addressing these issues for Japanese and American production networks in Asia (e.g., Encarnation, 
1995; Hatch and Yamamura, 1996; Ernst and Ravenhill, 2000; Ernst, 1997, 2000). Important differences have been 
identified in seven areas: geographic dispersion; product mix; localization of management; sourcing of components 
and capital goods; replication of domestic production networks; impact on trade; and distribution of R&D activities. 
16 During the early 1980s, when the U.S. dollar appreciated rapidly, cash-strapped American firms were the first to 
experiment with new forms of international production outsourcing (Ernst, 1997). 
17 Until 1994, the domestic market was reserved for Chinese state-owned enterprises, and virtually closed to foreign 
companies. 
18 A typical example is Sony’s “two-plant policy” that tries to avoid, at almost any cost to be dependent on just one 
centralized plant for a particular macro-region (Form 20 F report 2003). 
19 Japanese subsidiaries in China report that, “in order ….not to loose skilled managerial and technical personnel to 
other companies, we are paying them like we would Japanese employees. We are also giving favorable treatment for 
transportation and housing” (JBICI, 2003: 39,43). 
20 In the ASEAN region, Japanese firms over the last few years have concentrated primarily on financial 
consolidation and on the rationalization of supply chains and distribution channels. There have also been attempts to 
upgrade existing subsidiaries towards flexible mass production of products that, while no longer competitive in 
Japan, are considered to be too risky to transfer to China because of quality and/or intellectual property protection 
concerns. Overall however, Japanese FDI in the ASEAN region is unlikely to expand: a “wait-and-see” approach is 
combined with selective upgrading of some major operations. 
21 Examples of this renewed inflow of Japanese FDI include NEC’s decision to shift 70% of its cell phone 
production to China; Sanyo’s decision to concentrate all air conditioner production in China; Canon’s $80 million 
investment in Suzhou, producing copiers; Sony’s investments in new notebook production lines; Toshiba’s decision 
to build a very large production line for laptops in Hangzhou, and to transfer a substantial part of its digital TV set 
production; and Matsushita’s $ 26 million investments in two new plants producing semiconductors for homes 
appliances. 
22 Import dependence = imports/(production-minus exports + imports). 
23 This can have disastrous effects. For instance, Sony’s critically important release of its Playstation 2 game console 
in China was delayed by an embarrassing miscommunication with the Chinese government.  While the Ministry of 
Culture classifies the PS2 as a gaming machine, Sony registered it as an electronics product, and hence did not get 
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the required approval in time for the 2003 Christmas season. It took Sony a few weeks to correct its mistake 
(Interfax China IT & Telecom Weekly, 31 January 2004: 3) 
24 For local employees, knowledge of Japanese can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it might foster 
carrier perspectives, even if other skills are missing. On the other hand, however, knowledge of Japanese can also be 
a disadvantage. These local employees tend to be used as “trouble shooters”, and frequently get caught in the middle 
of conflicts between shop floor workers and senior Japanese managers who often cannot communicate directly. As a 
result, they find it difficult to concentrate on improving their specialist skills, while at the same time becoming the 
objects of jealousy from their local co-workers. 
25 Information provided by Dennis Tachiki. 
26 Incidentally, this general manager, P.Y. Lai, used to head Intel’s Penang facility in 1992 when I interviewed him 
in that position, which indicates the breadth of his exposure to leading-edge management practices by global US 
industry leaders. 
27 The number of Japanese R&D affiliates in the region covered by the JBICI surveys has increased by 102% from 
39 (in FY 2000) to 79 (in FY 2002). Yet, this compares with 92 R&D affiliates in North America and 70 in the EU-
15 (2002). China again has experienced the fastest growth: the number of Japanese R&D affiliates there increased 
by 115% from 13 to 28. 
28 A unifying theme for current Japanese R&D strategies that shows up in many annual reports and strategy papers is 
the concept of “black box” technologies. Matsushita for instance defines them as technologies “that cannot be easily 
imitated by competitors because they are: (1) protected under intellectual property rights, such as patents, (2) made 
of complex materials, processes, and know-how that cannot be copied, or (3) made using unique production 
methods, systems or control technologies. “ (Matsusthita Annual Report 2003: 7). And Sharp, one of the most 
innovative Japanese electronics companies, believes that protecting technologies through patents alone is 
insufficient, and that the key to success is to maintain exclusive control of manufacturing technologies by 
“concealing them more assiduously than product technologies” (JETRO, 2003: 44). 
29 For instance, NEC, the leader in R&D among the nine major Japanese electronics corporations, is a world leader 
in nanotechnology research, having invented the carbon nanotube that will be the basis for extremely lightweight 
computer display screens and minute and orders-of-magnitude more efficient semiconductors (Ikezawa, NRI 2003). 
30 While large Taiwanese firms like HonHai, Acer, and Mitac are constrained by government regulations, they have 
been highly innovative in developing indirect and informal partnerships with Chinese firms. 
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31 “Sanyo-Haier Group Alliance Offers Lucrative Foothold”, The Nikkei Weekly, 15 January 2002. 
32 “China Alliance Brings Opportunity, Problems”, The Yomiui Shimbun, 23 September 2002. 
33 Haier’s sales network consists of 42 subsidiaries, 9000 sales locations and almost 12,000 service locations. 
34 In addition to refrigerators, home air conditioners, washing machines and vacuum cleaners, where Haier is the 
market leader, the company also has moved aggressively into higher-value added digital consumer and 
communication devices. 
35 “Deal Sees Sanyo, Haier as Equals”, Asahi Shimbun, 10 January 2002. 
36 Machine-tool orders placed with Japanese firms totaled about Y 790 billion in 2001, down 19% from a year 
earlier. As recently as 1997, this figure exceeded Y 1 trillion (METI figures, quoted in “Machine Tools: A Shrinking 
Domestic Market”, Asahi Shimbun, 6 February 2002). 
37 Toshiaki Iue, president of the Sanyo Haier joint venture and son of Sanyo’s CEO, as quoted in “China Alliance 
Brings Opportunity, Problems”, The Yomiui Shimbun, 23 September 2002. 
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